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Abstract
Our study examines the impact of brokerage house (BH) reputation on the per-
formance of investment strategies following stock recommendation revisions
in the UK stock market. We develop two alternative proxies for BH reputation
based either on the past positions on the annual Institutional Investor (II) All-
Europe Research Team or on the past recommendation performance of BHs.
We find that BH reputation proxied by the past II rankings has no significant
impact on the recommendation performance, suggesting that the II rankings
are largely “popularity contests”. However, BH reputation proxied by the past
year recommendation performance of BHs has a significantly positive impact
on the recommendation performance in the next year, implying that the rec-
ommendation performance of BHs in the UK market is persistent. The boot-
strap simulations further confirm that the observed performance persistence
could be due to BH skill rather than BH luck (i.e., random chance).
KEYWORD S
Bootstrap simulations, brokerage house reputation, financial analysts, performance persistence,
stock recommendation revisions
1 | INTRODUCTION
Brokerage houses (BHs) constitute a large segment of the
financial services industry and play an important inter-
mediary role to connect buyers and sellers in the capital
markets. Analysts working for BHs collect and analyse
various publicly available information and/or sensitive
information not readily available to the public and then
make stock recommendations, which have been widely
considered to be valuable to investors when making
investment decisions. Whether stock recommendations
made by BHs can truly create investment value and pro-
mote market efficiency have been of great interest to
financial academics and investment professionals, though
they are clearly at odds with each other (Barber, Lehavy,
McNichols, & Trueman, 2001). Specifically, the semi-
strong form of market efficiency posits that investors
should not be able to trade profitably using any publicly
available information, such as stock recommendations.
Although Barber et al. (2001) show the profitability of
investment strategies based on stock recommendations,
these investment strategies are not easily exploitable in
practice as they require a great deal of trading and gener-
ate considerable transaction costs (see, also, Jegadeesh,
Kim, Krische, & Lee, 2004; Mikhail, Walther, &
Willis, 2004). However, BHs, in particular, those bulge
bracket houses, invest large amounts of money and
resources on security analysis, and investors pay millions
of dollars every year to purchase these recommendation
data, presumably because they both believe that stock
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recommendations are able to generate superior returns
(Ivkovic & Jegadeesh, 2004).
BHs, as repetitive players in the capital markets,
obtain and accumulate their reputation capitals by pro-
viding investors with high value-added services to facili-
tate transactions. In particular, BH reputation could be
affected by the accuracy and reliability of their stock rec-
ommendations and/or their rankings in financial press
(Fang, 2005). These observations provide a compelling
empirical motivation for our investigation into the role of
BH reputation in improving the recommendation perfor-
mance and distinguish our study from prior studies that
mainly focus on analyst reputation but largely ignore the
impact of BH reputation (see, e.g., Stickel, 1992 & 1995;
Leone & Wu, 2007; Emery & Li, 2009; Fang &
Yasuda, 2009 & 2014; Kucheev, Ruiz, & Sorensson, 2017;
among others). Specifically, the objective of this study is
to examine the performance of investment strategies fol-
lowing UK stock recommendation revisions, with specific
emphasis on the impact of BH reputation. On the one
hand, an investigation into this question will not only
shed fresh light on the extent to which specific BH repu-
tation measurements are related to the stock recommen-
dation performance, but also provide insights into
whether investors have an ex-ante reliable way of
enhancing their performance by following stock recom-
mendations issued by certain types of BHs, or ignoring,
those of others. On the other hand, despite the existence
of extensive analyst research in the US market, there is
surprisingly little related research in other developed
markets. The existing limited analyst research in the UK
stock market shows some different evidence from that in
the US market (see, e.g., Dimson & Fraletti, 1986; Ryan &
Taffler, 2006; Su, Zhang, Bangassa, & Joseph, 2019; For-
bes, Murphy, O'Keeffe, & Su, 2020). Jegadeesh and
Kim (2006) point out that an in-depth examination in
other developed markets will give us a comprehensive
picture of the extent to which the type of stock recom-
mendations is more valuable. The UK stock market, a
highly developed and sophisticated market, provides an
appropriate setting to conduct such analyst research. In
particular, the institutional settings and trading practices
of the UK market are partially different from, and inde-
pendent of, those in the US market;1 as a result, the exis-
ting US evidence may not justify the UK investment
practices.
Using a comprehensive sample of 58,647 UK stock
recommendation revisions, uniquely created by Mor-
ningstar Company Intelligence, we examine the impact of
BH reputation on the performance of upgrades and
downgrades over the period of January 1995 to June
2013. We develop two alternative proxies for BH reputa-
tion in the UK stock market and evaluate whether one
proxy for BH reputation is systematically superior to
the other. First, in each year T, we identify more pres-
tigious BHs as the top five based on their past year (T
− 1) positions on the annual Institutional Investor (II)
All-Europe Research Team, which has been ignored in
prior analyst research. However, the II rankings,
mainly based on the annual poll of money managers,
have been widely criticized by institutional investors
and analysts as being “popularity contests” with no
substance (see more discussions in Section 2). In prac-
tice, it could be reasonable for the investing public to
expect more prestigious BHs to issue more valuable
stock recommendations, as they maintain closer ties
with corporate management and provide more
resources to support market research. The second
proxy for BH reputation, developed in our study, is
based on the past stock recommendation performance
of BHs. For example, in each year T − 1, we calculate
the average return of stock recommendation revisions
made by each BH and then identify the most and worst
prestigious BHs in each year T as those with the
highest and lowest past year (T − 1) recommendation
performance, respectively. Accordingly, in our study,
we test the following two main hypotheses: (a) The (ir)
relevant BH reputation hypothesis—BH reputation is
(un)related to the recommendation performance; and
(b) the BH skill/luck hypothesis—if there exists a sig-
nificant positive relationship between BH reputation
and the recommendation performance, this relation-
ship is due to BH skill, rather than due to BH luck
(i.e., random chance).
We find some interesting evidence that not only
complements the existing analyst literature but has
particular relevance to investors and policymakers in
understanding the role of BHs in an important devel-
oped market context. First, we find that BH reputation
proxied by the II rankings has no impact on the recom-
mendation performance in the UK market. That is, it
is unlikely for investors to make profits by following
upward or downward revisions in the UK market,
irrespective of whether they are issued by BHs with
high or low past II rankings, which seems different
from the US evidence (see, e.g., Leone & Wu, 2007;
Fang & Yasuda, 2014; Kucheev et al., 2017). We con-
jecture that the positions of BHs on the annual II All-
Europe Research Team do not play an important role
in determining their reputation in the UK market,
compared with the influence of its counterpart in the
US market (see Fang & Yasuda, 2014; Hong &
Kubik, 2003; Hong, Lim, & Stein, 2000). Our results
confirm that it is unlikely for investors to make profits
by following upward or downward revisions in the UK
market, irrespective of whether they are made by BHs
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with high or low past II rankings. However, when BH
reputation is proxied purely by the past stock recom-
mendation performance of BHs, we find a significantly
positive relationship between BH reputation and the
recommendation performance. That is, BHs that gen-
erate superior (inferior) recommendation performance
in the past year continue generating superior (inferior)
recommendation performance in the next year, indi-
cating that the recommendation performance of BHs
in the UK market is persistent, in line with the US evi-
dence (see, Li, 2005).
Furthermore, we test whether the observed perfor-
mance persistence is simply as a result of BH luck
(i.e., random chance) or BH skill. To account for luck,
prior studies on portfolio performance evaluation gener-
ally use the out-of-sample performance persistence test,2
which, however, underestimates the likelihood that luck
(both good luck and bad luck) can also persist in the
short term (see, Neely, Weller, & Ulrich, 2009). To
address this problem, we apply the Fama and
French (2010) cross-sectional bootstrap simulation
method to distinguish BH luck from BH skill (see full
details in Section 5). Our simulated results confirm that
the reported performance persistence of BHs is not due to
BH luck, but due to BH skill.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first study that focuses on the relationship between BH
reputation and the recommendation performance in the
UK. First, we find that there is no relationship between
BH reputation, as proxied by the past positions on the
annual II All-Europe Research Team, and the recommen-
dation performance, in support of Emery and Li (2009)
that the II rankings are largely “popularity contests.” Sec-
ond, from an investor's perspective, the reported persis-
tence of the recommendation performance of BHs
implies that it is likely for investors to make profits by
following stock recommendation revisions made by BHs
in the UK market, even after controlling for transaction
costs, which provide clear evidence of a violation of the
semi-strong form of market efficiency. Third, this is the
first analyst study that uses the cross-sectional bootstrap
simulation method to distinguish BH luck from BH skill,
showing that more prestigious BHs have sufficient skills
in persistently generating superior recommendation per-
formance, while less prestigious BHs lack such skills and
persistently generate inferior recommendation
performance.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
The next section reviews the relevant analyst literature
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data
and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our main
empirical results, followed by bootstrap simulations in
Section 5. The final section concludes.
2 | RELATED ANALYST
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
There has been substantial growth in analyst research
regarding the performance of stock recommendations
issued by BHs since two influential studies of
Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996). One of the most
active areas in this stream of research is the impact of
analyst reputation on the stock recommendation perfor-
mance (see, e.g., Jackson, 2005; Leone & Wu, 2007;
Bagnoli, Watts, & Zhang, 2008; Emery & Li, 2009; Loh &
Stulz, 2011; Fang & Yasuda, 2014; Kucheev et al., 2017;
among others). The extant literature provides mixed evi-
dence on the relationship between analyst reputation and
the stock recommendation performance. For example,
Stickel (1995) examines 16,957 Buy and Sell recommen-
dations issued by 1,510 analysts over the period
1988–1991, showing that analyst reputation, proxied by
their positions on the annual II All-America Research
Team, is positively related to the short-term price reac-
tion, although the influence of analyst reputation appears
to be a temporary price pressure effect. Leone and
Wu (2007) also document such a positive relationship
over the period 1991–2000 and confirm that the recom-
mendation performance of All-Star analysts is persistent.
They attribute the performance persistence to All-Star
analysts' superior skill, the result of which suggests that
the II rankings serve a meaningful role in identifying
more prestigious analysts. In addition, Kucheev
et al. (2017) find that All-Star analysts outperform their
non-All Star counterparts for Buy and Strong Buy recom-
mendations, but not for Sell and Strong Sell recommen-
dations. However, the II rankings have been widely
criticized by institutional investors and analysts as being
“popularity contests” with no substance (see,
e.g., Emery & Li, 2009), leading the Wall Street Journal
(WSJ) to create its own rankings based on the past stock
recommendation performance (see details on the differ-
ences between the II and WSJ rankings in Appendix A).
Using a sample of 20,239 stock recommendations issued
by 5,941 analysts over the period 1993–2005, Emery and
Li (2009) comparatively examine the II and WSJ rank-
ings, but they find that neither of them has any signifi-
cant impact on the recommendation performance.
Generally speaking, more prestigious BHs receive
more attention in the market and their stock recommen-
dations are more likely to be recognized as a meaningful
indicator of a firm's future prospects. If investors realize
that they are adversely affected by biased stock recom-
mendations made by a BH on purpose, it will become
quite costly and difficult for the BH to convince investors
to follow its stock recommendations in the future; the
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damage to the BH's reputation will be immediate and
long-lasting. As reputation is extremely valuable and also
fragile, more prestigious BHs invariably attempt to pro-
tect their reputation capitals by resisting pressures to
make due diligence stock recommendations, which, in
turn, drive the market to efficiency (see, Fang &
Yasuda, 2009; Mehran & Stulz, 2007).
Accordingly, we extend the commonly employed
research design at the analyst level to the BH level and
test the following (ir)relevant BH reputation hypothesis
that BH reputation is (un)related to the stock recommen-
dation performance:
Hypothesis 1a BH reputation has no impact on the per-
formance of UK stock recommendation revisions.
Hypothesis 1b BH reputation has a significantly positive
impact on the performance of UK stock recommen-
dation revisions.
Although prior analyst research has established a posi-
tive relationship between analyst reputation and the stock
recommendation performance (see, Kucheev et al., 2017;
Stickel, 1995), it is not necessarily true that a BH's reputa-
tion is the sum of individual reputation of all analysts
employed by the BH, as unskilled analysts are likely to
piggyback on the reputation of the BH.3 More prestigious
BHs, compared with their less prestigious counterparts,
are supposed to possess greater access to in-house informa-
tion resources, for example, economists, market strategy
experts, and technical analysts, of which in-house eco-
nomic advisers are the most highly rated in terms of the
perceived usefulness (Clement, 1999). As such, even
unskilled analysts are able to benefit from these in-house
information resources in making valuable stock recom-
mendations. Moreover, Fang and Yasuda (2014, p. 236)
argue that some All-Star analysts are not really skilled but
achieve their first All-Star status simply due to luck (see,
also, Leone & Wu, 2007). Once these unskilled analysts
achieve All-Star status, they gain superior access to the
management of the firms they cover, which improves the
quality of their stock recommendations; in turn, the mar-
ket is expected to react more strongly to their stock recom-
mendations (see, Stickel, 1995; Hong et al., 2000; Leone &
Wu, 2007; Fang & Yasuda, 2009 & 2014; Kucheev
et al., 2017). Using a large sample of 392,711 stock recom-
mendations from October 1993 to December 2009, Fang
and Yasuda (2014) first divide all stock recommendations
into different reputation groups, according to analysts'
positions on the annual II All-America Research Team,
and then construct dynamic portfolios in each group based
on these recommendations. To address the question of
whether All-Star analysts can really generate superior
recommendation performance, they calculate and com-
pare the portfolio alphas in various reputation groups,
confirming that skill differences exist among analysts. In
addition, they report that superior recommendation per-
formance of All-Star analysts is not significantly eroded
after the adoption of Reg-FD in October 2000, suggesting
that the superior recommendation performance of All-Star
analysts is persistent and the performance persistence is
not entirely due to their luck, but due to their better access
to company management and/or market influence.
Like Fang and Yasuda (2014), prior studies on portfo-
lio performance evaluation generally account for luck by
using the out-of-sample test. For example, Carhart (1997)
sorts mutual funds into the winner and loser portfolios
based on the lagged one-year returns to examine the
short-term performance persistence. Although the out-of-
sample performance persistence test is quite popular, it
underestimates the likelihood that luck (both good and
bad luck) can also persist in the short term, as the alloca-
tion of sub-samples (such as the winner and loser portfo-
lios) could be largely based on noises (see, Fama &
French, 2010; Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, &
White, 2006). In addition, the sub-samples may not be
directly comparable, as the separation of the whole sam-
ple is somewhat arbitrary and thus lacks the expected
objectivity (see, Hsu & Kuan, 2005). Therefore, even if
BHs as a group do not show performance persistence, we
cannot rule out the possibility that there exist relatively
fewer BHs with superior recommendation performance
and their performance is persistent.
Accordingly, we employ the Fama and French (2010)
cross-sectional bootstrap simulation method, which is
able to distinguish BH luck from BH skill (see full details
in Section 5), to test the following BH skill/luck
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a If the stock recommendation performance
of BHs in the UK market is persistent, this is due to
BH skill, rather than due to BH luck (i.e., random
chance).
Hypothesis 2b If the stock recommendation performance
of BHs in the UK market is persistent, this is not due
to BH skill, but due to BH luck (i.e., random chance).
3 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Sample selection and descriptive
statistics
We obtain the real-time stock recommendations from the
Morningstar Extracted Data File: Historic Broker
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Recommendations for UK Registered and UK Listed
Companies, created by Morningstar Company Intelli-
gence. Each stock recommendation record contains infor-
mation on the name of the recommended stock, the
name of the BH issuing the recommendation, the starting
and expiration recommendation dates, and a rating
between 1 and 9 (1 = strong buy; 2 = buy; 3 = weak buy;
4 = weak buy/hold; 5 = hold; 6 = hold/sell; 7 = weak
sell; 8 = sell; and 9 = strong sell). We exclude stock rec-
ommendations that omit the name of BHs, those without
releasing the expiration dates, and/or those with data
errors. To allow for an intuitive comparison with prior
US analyst studies, we reclassify all original stock recom-
mendations into five categories: Strong Buys (1 and 2),
TABLE 1 The distribution of UK stock recommendation revisions
Panel A: The matrix of stock recommendation revisions
To new rating
From old rating Total %
Strong buys (1
and 2)
Buys (3
and 4)
Holds
(5)
Sells (6
and 7)
Strong sells (8
and 9)
Strong buys (1 and
2)
18,427 31.42 — 4,927 12,351 329 820
Buys (3 and 4) 9,805 16.72 4,768 — 4,281 577 179
Holds (5) 21,328 36.37 10,758 4,281 — 2,184 4,105
Sells (6 and 7) 3,482 5.94 245 510 2,026 — 701
Strong sells (8 and
9)
5,605 9.56 698 144 4,158 605 —
Overall 58,647 — 16,469 9,862 22,816 3,695 5,605
% — 100.00 28.08 16.82 38.90 6.30 9.90
Panel B: The distribution of up/downward revisions in the up/downgrade portfolio
The
recommendation
year
The upgrade portfolio The downgrade portfolio
No. of
covered
firms
No.
of
BHs
Average
rating
No. of
upward
revisions
No. of
covered
firms
No.
of
BHs
Average
rating
No. of
downward
revisions
1995 284 23 1.14 514 355 21 3.67 814
1996 513 34 1.21 1,246 501 33 3.52 1,436
1997 552 41 1.23 1,690 547 41 3.55 2,024
1998 558 35 1.28 1,652 559 35 3.58 2,048
1999 523 35 1.26 1,630 523 37 3.52 1,527
2000 416 35 1.26 1,137 421 36 3.45 1,225
2001 447 36 1.26 1,126 518 36 3.64 1,752
2002 478 38 1.24 1,113 486 39 3.74 1,260
2003 446 35 1.22 1,060 488 35 3.64 1,422
2004 490 40 1.24 1,316 474 41 3.63 1,586
2005 510 39 1.27 1,394 530 41 3.61 1,866
2006 490 41 1.26 1,321 509 41 3.54 1,532
2007 477 35 1.24 1,279 451 35 3.52 1,175
2008 404 35 1.17 934 453 34 3.68 1,344
2009 464 41 1.18 1,458 461 45 3.59 1,589
2010 392 35 1.20 933 352 32 3.45 974
2011 339 32 1.17 805 341 31 3.44 865
2012 292 27 1.17 592 342 27 3.48 818
(Continues)
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Buys (3 and 4), Holds (5), Sells (6 and 7), and Strong Sells
(8 and 9). We exclude all utilities and financials due to
their highly regulated nature, according to the two-digit
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes 30, 35,
and 65. Like Loh and Stulz (2011), we also exclude those
stock recommendations made in the 3 days around quar-
terly earnings announcements. Furthermore, we require
(a) that the gap between the starting and expiration rec-
ommendation dates is less than 365 days to ensure that
the BH actively follows the recommended stock; and
(b) that the relevant financial data of the recommended
stocks are available from the London Share Price Data-
base (LSPD).
In addition, stock recommendations often remain
unchanged for relatively long time periods, and thus
become stale and less informative over time (see, Boni &
Womack, 2006; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Jegadeesh &
Kim, 2006). Therefore, our study exclusively focuses on
stock recommendation revisions—upgrades and
downgrades—that tend to convey more valuable infor-
mation. Panel A of Table 1 presents the matrix of our
final sample of 58,647 UK stock recommendation revi-
sions over the period January 1995 to June 2013, that is,
44.88% are Strong Buys and Buys, 38.90% are Holds, and
16.20% are Sells and Strong Sells. As such, our sample is
much larger than has been employed in prior UK analyst
studies (see, e.g., Dimson & Fraletti, 1986; Ryan &
Taffler, 2006).
3.2 | BH reputation measurements and
research design
In our study, we develop two alternative proxies for BH
reputation in the UK stock market. Specifically, we pair
the adjacent 2 years (T − 1 and T) into a ranking year T
− 1 and an evaluation year T. For example, if 1995 is a
ranking year, then 1996 is the evaluation year. First, in
each year T, we identify more prestigious BHs as the top
five based on their past year (T − 1) positions on the
annual II All-Europe Research Team. The second proxy
for BH reputation is directly based on the past recom-
mendation performance of BHs. That is, in each year (T
− 1), we calculate the average abnormal return of stock
recommendation revisions issued by each BH, using the
intercept term (alphas) derived from various multi-factor
asset pricing models, for example, (a) the Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model (3F model, hereafter),
(b) the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (4F model, here-
after), and (c) the Fama and French (2015) five-factor
model (5F model, hereafter). We then identify the most
and worst prestigious BHs in year T as those with the
highest and lowest past year (T − 1) recommendation
performance (e.g., top quintile vs. bottom quintile or Best
five vs. non-Best five), respectively.
To evaluate the impact of BH reputation on the rec-
ommendation performance and to compare whether one
BH reputation measurement is systematically superior to
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Panel B: The distribution of up/downward revisions in the up/downgrade portfolio
The
recommendation
year
The upgrade portfolio The downgrade portfolio
No. of
covered
firms
No.
of
BHs
Average
rating
No. of
upward
revisions
No. of
covered
firms
No.
of
BHs
Average
rating
No. of
downward
revisions
2013 (January to
June)
151 23 1.20 204 175 21 3.55 270
Overall (January
1995 – June
2013)
1,639 95 1.23 21,404 1,760 95 3.58 25,527
Note: Panel A of this table presents the matrix of 58,647 UK stock recommendation revisions over the period January 1995 to June 2013,
while Panel B presents on the distribution of 21,404 upward (25,527 downward) changes in stock recommendations in the upgrade (down-
grade) portfolio over the sample period by the recommendation year, in terms of the number of recommended firms, the number of broker-
age houses (BHs), as well as the average rating and number of stock recommendation revisions. We exclude all utilities and financials from
the recommended firms and all stock recommendations are obtained from Morningstar Company Intelligence. A rating of 1 reflects a strong
buy, 2 a buy, 3 a weak buy, 4 a weak buy/hold, 5 a hold, 6 a hold/sell, 7 a weak sell, 8 a sell, and 9 a strong sell, which are reclassified into
five categories: Strong Buys (1 and 2), Buys (3 and 4), Holds (5), Sells (6 and 7), and Strong Sells (8 and 9). An upgrade portfolio consists of
all upward revisions to Strong Buys or Buys from previous Strong Sells, Sells, or Holds, while a downgrade portfolio consists of all down-
grades to Strong Sells, Sells, or Holds from previous Strong Buys or Buys. The upgrade portfolio does not include upward revisions from
Strong Sells to Holds, from Strong Sells to Sells, and from Sells to Holds, which can also be interpreted as negative recommendations, while
the downgrade portfolio does not include downward revisions from Strong Buys to Buys, which can also be interpreted as positive recom-
mendations. We report the average rating for stock recommendation revisions based on the five-point rating scale.
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the other, we divide the recommended stocks into vari-
ous BH reputation groups in each evaluation year T over
the whole sample period. In each BH reputation group,
we construct two portfolios: (a) An upgrade portfolio,
consisting of all stocks with upward revisions to Strong
Buy or Buy recommendations from previous Strong Sell,
Sell, or Hold recommendations; and (b) a downgrade
portfolio, consisting of all stocks with downward revi-
sions to Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold recommendations from
previous Strong Buy or Buy recommendations. Panel B of
Table 1 presents the distribution of upward and down-
ward revisions included in the upgrade and downgrade
portfolios, respectively, in each recommendation year.4
The up/downgrade portfolio is updated daily; for each
revision, the recommended stock enters the up/down-
grade portfolio at the close of trading on the day the revi-
sion is announced. If an up/downward revision is
announced on a non-trading day, the recommended
stock is added into the up/downgrade portfolio at the
close of the next trading day, and remains in the portfolio
until the stock is either down/upgraded or dropped from
coverage by the BH. If a stock is recommended by more
than one BH on a given date, then that stock will appear
multiple times in the up/downgrade portfolio on that
date, once for each BH.5
Like Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007), we apply
an equal monetary investment in each stock recommen-
dation revision, and calculate the daily value-weighted
return to the up/downgrade portfolio on date t:6
Rp,t =
Xnt
i=1
xi,t ×Ri,t
 
=
Xnt
i=1
xi,t, ð1Þ
where Ri,t represents the daily return for the rec-
ommended stock i on date t;7 nt represents the number of
up/downward revisions in the up/downgrade portfolio
p on date t; xi,t represents the compounded daily return
for the recommended stock i from the closing of trading
on the revision date through date t − 1.
In each evaluation year, T, we estimate the gross
returns to the upgrade and downgrade portfolios in
each BH reputation group using the intercept term of
αp,T derived from various multi-factor asset pricing
models, for example, the 3F model, 4F model, and 5F
model:
Rp,t−Rf ,t = αp,T + βp Rm,t−Rf ,t
 
+ spSMBt + hpHMLt + εp,t,
ð2Þ
Rp,t−Rf ,t = αp,T + βp Rm,t−Rf ,t
 
+ spSMBt
+ hpHMLt +mpMOMt + εp,t, ð3Þ
Rp,t−Rf ,t = αp,T + βp Rm,t−Rf ,t
 
+ spSMBt + hpHMLt
+ rpRMWt + cpCAMt + εp,t,
ð4Þ
where Rp,t and Rm,t are the daily return on the up/down-
grade portfolio p and on the FTSE All-Share Index,
respectively; Rf,t represents the daily 3-month UK T-bill
rate; SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt represent the daily returns
on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size,
book-to-market (B/M), and price momentum, respec-
tively; RMWt and CMAt represent the daily returns on
zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for operat-
ing profitability and investment, respectively;8 εp,t repre-
sents the error term. A significantly positive (negative)
αp,T indicates that the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio in
each BH reputation group is profitable after controlling
for various market and firm-specific risks.
Barber et al. (2001) argue that investment strategies
based on stock recommendations require a great deal of
trading and generate considerable transaction costs, so
we evaluate the recommendation performance as the
average daily net abnormal returns to the up/downgrade
portfolio after accounting for transaction costs, that is,
the average daily gross returns net of transaction costs
(see details of transaction costs in Appendix B).
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship between BH reputation and the performance of
UK stock recommendation revisions. In Section 4.1, we
find that BH reputation, proxied by the past II rankings,
has no impact on the recommendation performance,
while Section 4.2 shows that BH reputation, proxied by
the past year recommendation performance, has a signifi-
cantly positive impact on the recommendation perfor-
mance in the next year, suggesting that the stock
recommendation performance of BHs in the UK market
is persistent. In this section, we mainly focus on dis-
cussing empirical results under the 3F model, as our
results remain qualitatively similar under the 4F and 5F
models.
4.1 | BH reputation proxied by the past
II rankings
Panel A of Table 2 presents the average daily abnormal
returns to the upgrade and downgrade portfolios within
two BH reputation groups over the whole sample period,
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based on their past year (T − 1) II rankings. The left side
of Panel A shows that the upgrade portfolio does not gen-
erate significantly positive abnormal returns under vari-
ous multi-factor asset pricing models, no matter whether
these upward revisions are issued by more or less presti-
gious BHs. For example, upward revisions issued by Top
5 and non-Top 5 BHs generate statistically insignificant
average daily abnormal returns of 1.821 basis points (t-
stat = 1.56; 4.695% annualized) and 1.771 basis points (t-
stat = 1.43; 4.564% annualized),9 respectively, under the
3F model. In addition, to test the differences in sub-
sample average returns, we employ the parametric statis-
tical test (t-stat) and non-parametric statistical test
(Kruskal–Wallis χ2); in particular, the Kruskal–Wallis
non-parametric test does not require equal sample sizes
and it is robust to departures from normality. Specifically,
both parametric and non-parametric tests show that the
difference of the average daily abnormal returns to the
upgrade portfolio between both BH reputation groups is
statistically insignificant (t-stat = 1.21; χ2 = 2.09), imply-
ing that the II rankings have no impact on the recom-
mendation performance of the upgrade portfolio.
The right side of Panel A reports the statistically insig-
nificant abnormal returns to the downgrade portfolio
within both BH reputation groups. For example, down-
ward revisions issued by Top 5 and non-Top 5 BHs gener-
ate insignificantly negative average daily abnormal
returns of −0.660 basis points (t-stat = −1.21; −1.649%
annualized) and − 0.568 basis points (t-stat = −1.35;
−1.421% annualized), respectively, under the 3F model.
Our parametric and non-parametric tests show no statis-
tically significant difference of the average daily abnor-
mal returns to the downgrade portfolio between the two
BH reputation groups (t-stat = 0.82; χ2 = 1.76). In Panel
B of Table 2, we replicate all analyses using BH reputa-
tion measurement based on the past three-year (T – 3,
T – 2, T − 1) moving average of positions on the annual
II All-Europe Research Team, showing that our results
are qualitatively similar.10
Furthermore, we report the average daily abnormal
returns to the up/downgrade portfolio within both BH
reputation groups in each evaluation year, to rule out the
concern that our evidence shown in Table 2 is due to the
extreme results in a specific year. Figure 1 illustrates con-
sistent evidence that the performance of the up/down-
grade portfolio is not significantly different between Top
5 and non-Top 5 BHs, based on the II rankings, in each
evaluation year. This confirms that the II rankings of
BHs do not play an important role in making valuable
stock recommendation revisions in the UK market.
Therefore, our evidence supports the irrelevant Hypothe-
sis 1a that BH reputation, based on the past II rankings,
has no impact on the recommendation performance.
That is, it is unlikely for investors to make profits by fol-
lowing upward or downward revisions in the UK market,
irrespective of whether they are issued by BHs with high
or low past II rankings, which seems different from that
reported in the US market (see, e.g., Leone & Wu, 2007;
Fang & Yasuda, 2014; Kucheev et al., 2017). The discrep-
ancy could be explained by the less influence of the II
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FIGURE 1 The performance of the up/downgrade portfolio within two reputation groups (Top 5 vs. Non-Top 5) based on the past year
(T − 1) II rankings in each calendar year
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All-Europe Research Team in the UK market, compared
with the influence of its US counterpart (see Fang &
Yasuda, 2014; Hong et al., 2000; Hong & Kubik, 2003).
4.2 | BH reputation proxied by the past
recommendation performance
4.2.1 | Quintile 1 versus quintile 5
Panel A of Table 3 presents the average daily abnormal
returns to the upgrade and downgrade portfolios within
each BH reputation group over the whole sample period,
based on their past recommendation performance. Spe-
cifically, all BHs are divided into quintiles by their past
year (T − 1) recommendation performance. Quintiles
1 and 5 represent the most and worst prestigious BH
groups generating the highest and lowest recommenda-
tion performance in the past year (T − 1), respectively.
The left side of Panel A shows a significantly positive
relationship between BH reputation and the recommen-
dation performance of the upgrade portfolio. For exam-
ple, upward revisions issued by BHs within Quintile
1 generate a significantly positive average daily abnormal
return of 2.404 basis points (t-stat = 2.71; 6.245% annual-
ized), at the 1% level, under the 3F model; an insignifi-
cantly positive average daily abnormal return of 1.020
basis points (t-stat = 1.04; 2.604% annualized) for Quintile
5. Furthermore, our parametric and non-parametric tests
show statistically significant difference of the average
daily abnormal returns to the upgrade portfolio between
Quintiles 1 and 5 (t-stat = 2.93; χ2 = 13.08), at the 1%
level, implying the performance of the upgrade portfolio
is persistent. That is, the past year (T − 1) recommenda-
tion performance of the upgrade portfolio has a signifi-
cant impact on the recommendation performance in
year T.
The right side of Panel A reports that the average
daily abnormal returns to the downgrade portfolios
monotonically change from Quintile 1 to Quintile 5. For
example, downward revisions issued by BHs within
Quintile 1 generate a significantly negative average daily
abnormal return of −0.684 basis points (t-stat = −2.74;
−1.709% annualized), at the 1% level, under the 3F
model; an insignificantly negative average daily abnor-
mal returns of −0.437 basis points (t-stat = −0.97;
−1.095% annualized) for Quintile 5. The difference of the
average daily abnormal returns to the downgrade portfo-
lio between Quintiles 1 and 5 is statistically significant (t-
stat = 3.68; χ2 = 14.64), at the 1% level, again suggesting
that the performance of the downgrade portfolio is persis-
tent. Our conclusions hold up well in Panel B of Table 3
when we divide all up/downward revisions into quintiles
by BH reputation based on their past three-year (T – 3,
T – 2, T − 1) moving average recommendation
performance.
Moreover, we report the average daily abnormal
returns to the up/downgrade portfolio within Quintiles
1 and 5 in each evaluation year. Figure 2 illustrates con-
sistent evidence, showing significant difference of the
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FIGURE 2 The performance of the up/downgrade portfolio within two reputation groups (Quintile 1 vs. Quintile 5) based on the past
year (T − 1) recommendation performance in each calendar year
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recommendation performance of the up/downgrade port-
folio between Quintiles 1 and 5 in a vast majority of eval-
uation years. This confirms that the past year
recommendation performance of BHs plays an important
role in making valuable upward and downward revisions
in the next year. Overall, our evidence supports Hypothe-
sis 1b that BH reputation, based on the past recommen-
dation performance, has a significantly positive impact
on the recommendation performance.
4.2.2 | Best 5 versus non-best 5
To make a point-by-point comparison with BH reputation
proxied by the II rankings, we also divide all BHs into two
groups (i.e., Best 5 vs. non-Best 5), based on their past rec-
ommendation performance. Specifically, Panel A of
Table 4 presents the average daily abnormal returns to the
upgrade and downgrade portfolios within the two reputa-
tion groups over the whole sample period, based on their
past year (T − 1) recommendation performance. The left
side of Panel A shows that upward revisions issued by Best
5 BHs generate a significantly positive average daily abnor-
mal return of 2.298 basis points (t-stat = 2.44; 5.961%
annualized), at the 5% level, under the 3F model; an insig-
nificantly positive average daily abnormal return of 1.649
basis points (t-stat = 1.26; 4.243% annualized) for non-Best
5 BHs. Moreover, our parametric and non-parametric tests
show statistically significant difference of the average daily
abnormal returns to the upgrade portfolio between the
two groups (t-stat = 2.31; χ2 = 5.69), at the 5% level.
The right side of Panel A shows that downward revi-
sions issued by Best 5 BHs generate a significantly nega-
tive average daily abnormal return of −0.667 basis points
(t-stat = −2.51; −1.667% annualized), at the 5% level,
under the 3F model; an insignificantly negative average
daily abnormal return of −0.556 basis points (t-
stat = −1.46; −1.391% annualized) for non-Best 5 group.
The difference of the average daily abnormal returns to
the downgrade portfolio between the two groups is statis-
tically significant (t-stat = −2.89; χ2 = −12.05), at the 1%
level. Our results are qualitatively the same when we
divide all BHs into Best5 and non-Best5 groups by BH
reputation based on their past three-year (T –3, T –2, T
− 1) moving average recommendation performance (see
Panel B of Table 4).
In addition, the significant difference of the perfor-
mance of the up/downgrade portfolio between the Best
5 and non-Best 5 groups is shown in all evaluation years
(see Figure 3). Overall, our results are consistent with
those shown in Section 4.2.1—the recommendation per-
formance of BHs in the UK market is persistent—
confirming that the past recommendation performance
of BHs plays an important role in making valuable
upward and downward revisions in the UK.11
5 | BOOTSTRAP SIMULATIONS
Thus far, we find empirical evidence that the recommen-
dation performance of BHs is persistent in the UK, in line
with Leone and Wu (2007) and Fang and Yasuda (2014).
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FIGURE 3 The performance of the up/downgrade portfolio within two reputation groups (Best 5 vs. Non-Best 5) based on the past year
(T − 1) recommendation performance in each calendar year
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In this section, we further test whether the reported perfor-
mance persistence is due to BH luck (i.e., random chance)
or due to BH skill by using the Fama and French (2010)
cross-sectional bootstrap simulation method. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to apply the cross-sectional
bootstrap simulation method to distinguish BH luck for BH
skill. The bootstrap simulation method, initially proposed by
Kosowski et al. (2006) in mutual funds research, resamples
the residuals from individual fund returns independently but
keeps the effect of common risk factors unchanged histori-
cally. Fama and French (2010, p. 1940), however, argue that
“failure to account for the joint distribution of fund returns,
and of fund and explanatory returns, biases the inferences of
Kosowski et al. (2006) toward positive performance,” and thus
jointly resample both of them. In our study, we explain the
Fama and French (2010) cross-sectional bootstrap simulation
method with the 3F model, but the same bootstrap procedure
can be extended to the 4F and 5F models.12
First, we estimate the 3F model to generate the esti-
mated abnormal returns, factor loadings, and residuals
using the time-series of daily excess returns for the up/
downgrade portfolio including up/downward revisions
made by each BH j, (Rj,p,t − Rf,t; j = 1, …, N):13
Rj,p,t−Rf ,t = α^j,p + β^j,p Rm,t−Rf ,t
 
+ s^j,pSMBt + h^j,pHMLt + ε^j:p,t: ð5Þ
Second, we save the coefficient estimates,
α^j,p, β^j,p, s^j,p, h^j,p
n o
, the time-series of estimated residuals,
ε^j,p,t; t=Tj,0,…,Tj,1
 
, and the actual t-statistic of abnor-
mal return, t^α^j,p , where Tj,0 and Tj,1 are the dates of the
first and last daily returns available for BH j, respectively.
Third, we generate a pseudo-time-series of resampled
residuals, ε^bj,p,tb ; tb =T
b
j,0,…,Tbj,1
n o
, by randomly drawing
residuals from the saved residual vector,
ε^j,p,t; t=Tj,0,…,Tj,1
 
, with replacements, where b is the
bootstrap simulation index. In the same way, we generate
a pseudo-time-series of risk factors,
Rm,tb−Rf ,tb
 b
,SMBbtb ,HML
b
tb
n o
, by randomly drawing
risk factors from the original risk factor vector, {(Rm,t−Rf,
t), SMBt, HMLt}, with replacements.
Fourth, we generate a time-series of pseudo-daily
excess returns, Rj,p,tb −Rf ,tb
 b
, imposing the null hypothe-
sis of zero true recommendation performance (α^j,p=0):
Fifth, we regress the pseudo-daily excess returns,
Rj,p,tb−Rf ,tb
 b
, on the three factors:
Rj,p,tb −Rf ,tb
 b
= α^bj,p+ β^j,p Rm,tb−Rf ,tb
 
+ s^j,pSMBtb
+ h^j,pHMLtb + ε^j,p,tb : ð7Þ
Repeating the above steps across all BHs, j = 1, …,
N (N = 95 for the upgrade or downgrade portfolio in our
study), we obtain a draw from the cross-section of simu-
lated returns, α^bj,p
n o
, and their corresponding t-statistics,
t^
b
α^j,p
n o
. The simulated α^bj,p and t^
b
α^j,p
represent the sampling
variation around a zero true recommendation perfor-
mance, entirely due to BH luck. We then order all simu-
lated t^
b
α^j,p
into a separate cross-sectional distribution from
the best-performing BH to the worst-performing BH. We
repeat the above bootstrap simulation 10,000 times, say,
b = 10,000.
Like Fama and French (2010), our study focuses on
presenting the distribution of the t-statistics of the actual
return, t^α^j,p , which represents information ratio, because
the t-statistic scales the return by its standard errors and
thus has superior statistical properties (Cuthbertson, Nit-
zsche, & O'Sullivan, 2008; Gallefoss, Hansen, Haukaas, &
Molnár, 2015). We compare the actual t-statistic of each
BH with its 10,000 simulated t-statistic. For the upgrade
(downgrade) portfolio, if the simulated t-statistics are
greater (less) than the actual t-statistics in less than 5% of
the 10,000 simulations, we reject the hypothesis that the
statistically significant portfolio performance is due to
BH luck, and vice versa.
Table 5 presents the actual t-statistics, t^α^j,p , against the
average simulated t-statistics, t^
b
αj,p
, for each BH at the
orders from the best-performing BH to the worst-
performing BH, along with the fraction of the 10,000 sim-
ulations that generate higher (lower) simulated t-statistics
than the corresponding actual t-statistics for the upgrade
(downgrade) portfolio. Specifically, Panel A of Table 5
shows that, for the upgrade portfolios, the actual t-
statistics are always above their corresponding average
simulated t-statistics, and, in particular, less than 5% of
the 10,000 simulated t-statistics are higher than their
corresponding actual t-statistics for the best-performing
BHs (e.g., the Best 5 BHs). For example, for the #01 (#02)
BH, only 1.44% (2.49%) of the simulated t-statistics are
higher than the actual t-statistics, clearly suggesting that
Rj,p,tb −Rf ,tb
 b
=0+ β^j,p Rm,tb −Rf ,tb
 b
+ s^j,pSMBbtb + h^j,pHML
b
tb + ε^
b
j,p,tb
n o
: ð6Þ
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TABLE 5 Bootstrap simulation results
Panel A: The upgrade portfolio
BH rank
3F model 4F model 5F model
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p > t^α^j,p
 
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p > t^α^j,p
 
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p > t^α^j,p
 
#01 (best) 3.86 3.28 1.44 3.75 3.12 1.57 3.57 3.38 1.45
#02 3.35 2.90 2.49 3.31 2.81 2.75 3.21 2.93 2.81
#03 2.98 2.59 3.89 2.96 2.52 3.30 2.88 2.61 3.45
#04 2.50 2.17 4.01 2.48 2.11 4.26 2.41 2.19 4.44
#05 2.22 1.89 4.86 2.16 1.83 5.79 2.09 1.94 4.68
#06–10 1.56 1.36 10.83 1.56 1.32 11.94 1.51 1.36 10.76
#11–20 1.44 1.21 14.12 1.39 1.03 14.83 1.18 1.24 14.67
#21–30 1.24 0.95 19.00 1.08 0.69 19.69 0.79 1.08 19.57
#31–40 0.80 0.64 22.06 0.73 0.51 23.57 0.58 0.73 25.65
#41–50 0.56 0.45 27.25 0.52 0.39 28.30 0.45 0.49 26.87
#51–60 0.33 0.27 33.02 0.31 0.23 31.44 0.26 0.29 33.87
#61–70 0.25 0.20 37.63 0.23 0.18 38.58 0.21 0.21 39.12
#71–80 −0.28 −0.28 43.42 −0.28 −0.34 42.85 −0.35 −0.35 43.66
#81–90 −0.66 −0.69 48.77 −0.67 −0.77 48.68 −0.75 −0.83 46.75
#91 −1.17 −1.26 52.64 −1.23 −1.29 51.58 −1.26 −1.47 52.34
#92 −1.51 −1.63 57.76 −1.59 −1.66 58.03 −1.62 −1.89 58.42
#93 −2.07 −2.23 61.55 −2.18 −2.28 62.44 −2.22 −2.59 61.90
#94 −2.54 −2.72 66.69 −2.65 −2.82 66.06 −2.75 −3.18 65.41
#95 (worst) −3.29 −3.31 68.91 −3.43 −3.34 69.13 −3.59 −3.40 69.72
Panel B: The downgrade portfolio
BH rank
3F model 4F model 5F model
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p < t^α^j,p
 
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p < t^α^j,p
 
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p < t^α^j,p
 
#01 (best) −3.52 −3.12 1.96 −3.50 −3.13 1.20 −3.45 −3.16 1.44
#02 −3.12 −2.61 2.59 −3.02 −2.67 1.78 −2.82 −2.79 2.36
#03 −2.25 −1.91 3.46 −2.24 −1.91 3.30 −2.02 −2.04 3.49
#04 −2.57 −2.18 3.94 −2.48 −2.23 4.40 −2.39 −2.29 4.97
#05 −1.93 −1.66 5.53 −1.91 −1.67 4.90 −1.79 −1.74 5.20
#06–10 −1.70 −1.44 10.72 −1.64 −1.47 12.82 −1.57 −1.52 12.96
#11–20 −1.38 −1.17 14.37 −1.33 −1.20 13.52 −1.28 −1.23 14.15
#21–30 −1.10 −0.93 16.66 −1.05 −0.97 17.26 −1.04 −0.97 16.71
#31–40 −0.90 −0.75 22.55 −0.85 −0.78 24.76 −0.83 −0.79 22.18
#41–50 −0.78 −0.62 27.35 −0.71 −0.66 28.01 −0.68 −0.68 27.29
#51–60 −0.39 −0.29 30.49 −0.35 −0.32 29.92 −0.31 −0.31 30.25
#61–70 0.03 0.03 35.99 0.02 0.02 32.18 0.01 0.02 32.42
#71–80 0.14 0.15 38.48 0.13 0.14 35.50 0.12 0.12 35.95
#81–90 0.76 0.84 40.60 0.70 0.79 40.09 0.67 0.69 41.22
#91 1.21 1.64 43.26 0.88 1.20 43.17 0.58 1.05 44.56
#92 1.66 1.73 47.01 1.46 1.65 47.33 1.34 1.43 49.09
#93 2.03 2.14 50.50 1.80 2.03 52.77 1.66 1.75 54.94
#94 2.38 2.49 58.53 2.09 2.36 57.53 1.93 2.04 60.12
(Continues)
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the superior performance of the upgrade portfolio is due
to BH skill, rather than due to BH luck. Moreover, for the
relatively poor-performing BHs (e.g., #06–95 BHs), more
than 10% of the simulated t-statistics are higher than the
corresponding actual t-statistics. Similar evidence is
found for the downgrade portfolio as shown in Panel B of
Table 5.
Overall, our simulated results are in support of
Hypothesis 2a that the reported performance persistence
of BHs could be due to BH skill, rather than due to BH
luck (i.e., random chance).
6 | CONCLUSIONS
Our study examines the impact of BH reputation on the
performance of investment strategies following stock rec-
ommendation revisions in the UK. We develop two alter-
native proxies for BH reputation in the UK stock market
either based on the past positions on the annual II All-
Europe Research Team or based on the past recommen-
dation performance in each calendar year. Using a
unique dataset of 58,647 UK stock recommendation revi-
sions over the period of January 1995 to June 2013, we
find some interesting evidence that BH reputation
proxied by the past positions on the annual II All-Europe
Research Team has no impact on the recommendation
performance, supporting Emery and Li (2009) that the II
rankings are largely “popularity contests.” However, BH
reputation proxied by the past year recommendation per-
formance has a significantly positive impact on the rec-
ommendation performance in the next year, implying
that the recommendation performance of BHs is persis-
tent. The reported persistence of the recommendation
performance of BHs provides clear evidence of a violation
of the semi-strong form of market efficiency, and from an
investor's perspective, it is likely for investors to make
profits by following stock recommendation revisions
made by BHs in the UK market, even after controlling
for transaction costs. Finally, our cross-sectional boot-
strap simulations confirm that the observed performance
persistence of BHs could be due to BH skill, rather than
due to BH luck (i.e., random chance). That is, more pres-
tigious BHs have sufficient skills in persistently generat-
ing superior recommendation performance, while less
prestigious BHs lack such skills and persistently generate
inferior recommendation performance.
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ENDNOTES
1 For example, the US regulatory oversight appears to be more frag-
mented, thereby giving rise to significant gaps in the monitoring
and enforcement roles. That is, the US financial market is more
exposed to regulatory risk that might have an influence on the
recommendation performance. See more discussions on the differ-
ences of market structure in the US and UK markets in the speech
of “Comparing UK and US Macroprudential Systems: Lessons for
China” given by Donald Kohn at the Global Financial Forum,
Tsinghua University, Beijing, on May 11, 2014 (available at:
https://goo.gl/SHWkdX).
2 The rationality behind the out-of-sample test is if BHs truly pos-
sess skill or information advantages over the market, they are
likely to continue generating abnormal returns in the out-of-
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Panel B: The downgrade portfolio
BH rank
3F model 4F model 5F model
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p < t^α^j,p
 
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p < t^α^j,p
 
t^α^j,p t^
b
α^j,p
% t^bα^j,p < t^α^j,p
 
#95 (worst) 2.41 2.58 62.41 2.28 2.43 65.34 2.02 2.19 67.50
Note: This table presents the values of t-statistics at selected percentiles (%) of the distribution of t-statistics of the actual t^α^j,p
 
and simulated
t^
b
α^j,p
 
abnormal returns, as well as the percentage (%) of the 10,000 simulation runs that produce lower values of t-statistics at the selected
percentiles than those actual abnormal returns (% Simulated t^
b
α^j,p
> Actual t^α^j,p ) for the upgrade portfolio and (% Simulated t^
b
α^j,p
< Actual t^α^j,p )
the downgrade portfolio. #01 (#95) represents the BH with the best (worst) recommendation performance among the total of 95 BHs involved
in making up/downward revisions included in the up/downgrade portfolio. To save space, the average values of the actual and simulated t-
statistics as well as the selected percentiles are reported for #06–10, #11–20, #21–30, #31–40, #41–50, #51–60, #61–70, #71–80, and #81–90.
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sample period as well; otherwise, their performance is due to luck
or random chance, it is likely to disappear in the out-of-sample
period. For example, Fang and Yasuda (2014) use Regulation Fair
Disclosure (Reg-FD) by the US Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) in October 2000 as a natural experiment. They find
that the superior recommendation performance of All-Star ana-
lysts is not significantly eroded after the adoption of Reg-FD,
suggesting that the performance persistence of All-Star analysts is
not entirely due to their luck, in line with Leone and Wu (2007).
3 Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) also call into question the informa-
tion role played by analysts in that their stock recommendation
revisions often piggyback on public information (e.g., corporate
events and news), thus providing investors with little incremental
information (see, also, Altinkilic, Balashov, & Hansen, 2013).
4 The total number of stock recommendation revisions included in
the upgrade and downgrade portfolios is 46,931
(= 21,404 + 25,527), apparently less than the number of 58,647,
as shown in Panel A of Table 1, which is not surprising, however.
The upward revisions from Strong Sells to Sells, from Strong Sells
to Holds, and from Sells to Holds are not included in the upgrade
portfolio, as they can also be interpreted as negative recommenda-
tions. Similarly, the downward revisions from Strong Buys to Buys
are not included in the downgrade portfolio, as they can also be
interpreted as positive recommendations (see, also, Stickel, 1995).
5 Specifically, in our sample, a very small proportion (4.585%) of
upgrades and downgrades is made by more than one BH on a
given date, for example, 3.401% (728 out of 21,404) of upgrades
and 5.578% (1,424 out of 25,527) of downgrades.
6 The value-weighted returns enable us to better capture the eco-
nomic significance of our results, while the equal-weighted
returns are, on average, biased upward due to the bid-ask bounce,
that is, the returns of large size firms will be more heavily repre-
sented in the aggregate returns than those of small size firms (see,
Barber et al., 2001).
7 We explicitly exclude the return on the first trading day as many
investors, particularly small investors, tend to react to information
with a delay. Barber et al. (2001, p. 534) argue that “it is impracti-
cal for them to engage in the daily portfolio rebalancing that is
needed to respond to the changes.”
8 The daily returns on size, value, and momentum in the UK stock
market are collected from the Xfi Centre for Finance and Invest-
ment at University of Exeter, while we construct the profitability
and investment factors in the UK stock market, strictly following
Fama and French (2015).
9 Like Li (2005), we also report the annualized abnormal return as
(1 + daily abnormal net return to the up/downgrade portfo-
lio)252–1.
10 We also replicate our analysis by identifying more (less) presti-
gious BHs as the top 10 (non-top 10) on the II All-Europe
Research Team, showing qualitatively similar results. That is, BH
reputation proxied by the past II rankings has no impact on the
recommendation performance, the results of which are not
reported for the sake of brevity but available on request.
11 Similar to Emery and Li (2009), we also calculate information
ratio as the alternative recommendation performance, which is
the t-statistic of the average daily abnormal return to the up/
downgrade portfolio. We then divide all BHs into quintiles
(or Best 5 and Non-Best 5 groups) by their past information ratio
and replicate all analyses in Tables 2–4, obtaining consistent con-
clusions. These results are not reported to save space, but avail-
able on request.
12 In contrast, Su et al. (2019) develop a rolling window-based time-
series bootstrap simulation method, producing simulated results
for the up/downgrade portfolio including all stocks rec-
ommended by Top 5 BHs in a total of 4,420 one-year rolling win-
dows over the whole sample period January 1995 to June 2013 (see,
also., Su & Zhang, 2020). The objective of the time-series bootstrap
simulations is to test whether Top 5 BHs are able to generate superior
recommendation performance in certain time periods.
13 We conduct bootstrap simulations for the upgrade and down-
grade portfolios separately. N represents a total of 95 BHs
involved in making up/downward revisions included in the up/
downgrade portfolio (see Table 1).
14 For example, in 2001, the II sent ballots to more than 780 institu-
tions and received the opinions of more than 3,200 money man-
agers from about 400 institutions.
15 On October 29, 1991, the “Heard on the Street” column of the
WSJ reported that, at most BHs, the three most important factors
determining analyst pay are an evaluation of the analyst by
(a) the brokerage sales force, (b) the standing in the II poll, and
(c) job offers from competitors.
16 It is quite usual that analysts attempt to influence the II poll by
visiting money managers about the time they vote. This practice
is confirmed by a research director quoted in the WSJ as saying,
“most of the guys know that they will be visiting for the II in the
spring. I am a lonely guy in March and April shortly before the
balloting” (Stickel, 1992).
17 Like the WSJ, the Thomson Reuters StarMine Analyst Awards
also recognize the world's top individual analysts and sell-side
BHs based on the objective measurement of their estimate accu-
racy and recommendation performance (see details in Kucheev
et al., 2017), which has been rigorously tested and proven in the
marketplace since 1998. Given that our sample period starts
before the year of 1998, we do not discuss the details of StarMine
Analyst Awards in Appendix B.
18 Barber et al. (2001) estimate the average round-trip transaction
costs of 1.31% in the US. Despite the lack of readily available data
regarding short selling costs in the UK, we assume a short selling
cost of 1.50%, according to Su et al. (2019) and Su, Zhang, and
Hudson (2020).
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APPENDIX
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (II) ANDWALL
STREET JOURNAL (WSJ) RANKINGS
Each year, in March, April, or May, the II sends surveys
to a variety of money managers in the US, European, and
Asian investment funds to evaluate analysts on the basis
of a series of criteria, such as accessibility/responsiveness,
industry knowledge, special services, stock selection,
earnings estimates, written reports, and so on (see, Brad-
ley, Gokkaya, & Liu, 2017).14 In its October issue each
year, the II publishes its first, second, third, and runner-
up teams determined by the weighted average of the ret-
urned scores. Typically, only one analyst per industry is
listed in each of the first and second research teams, but
multiple analysts from the same industry are common in
the third and runner-up research teams.
Given that the II rankings are weighted by the size of
respondent's institution, they are likely to favour analysts
at large BHs. In fact, the II survey forms ask respondents
to name and rank four best analysts in each industry with-
out identifying any analysts, so respondents have to recall
or look up analyst names to be able to vote. Compared
with analysts at large BHs, analysts at small BHs are less
likely to be known, so it is hard for them to achieve
enough recognition to score well on the ballot. Also, there
is a potential for conflicts of interest for large BHs, as they
often have analysts in one division and money managers
who are surveyed in another division and these managers
may be biased in favour of analysts in their own BHs.
Although no claim is made that the II rankings are
indicative of future recommendation performance, it is
likely that many investors interpret them in this manner.
The positions on the annual II All-America Research Team
can be viewed as a proxy for analyst reputation and as one
of the most important criteria for determining analyst pay
at most BHs.15,16 The directors of research at major BHs
confirm that All-Star analysts are generally paid higher sal-
aries. In particular, BHs tend to display their past recom-
mendation performance or the number of All-Star analysts
in advertisements designed to attract new clients.
In addition, the II rankings are widely criticized due to
their biased election criteria, which add more weights on
“accessibility/responsiveness” than on “earnings estimates”
and “stock selection.” For example, “earnings estimates”
and “stock selection” are typically listed near the bottom of
all election criteria, while “accessibility/responsiveness” is
ranked highly. This suggests that money managers tend to
value information that is passed along in private communi-
cations rather than analysts' research reports.
To rule out the concern that the II rankings are not
mainly based on the past stock recommendation perfor-
mance, theWSJ created its own ranking in 1993.17 Specif-
ically, the WSJ publishes a quarterly listing of the largest
BHs, ranked by their recommendation performance dur-
ing the past calendar year. Although the WSJ rankings
are determined solely by the recommendation perfor-
mance, it explicitly imposes eligibility requirements on
analysts, which could bias the rankings (Emery &
Li, 2009). For example, each year, the WSJ ranks the top
five analysts in each specific industry, based on their rec-
ommendation performance. To be eligible for the WSJ
rankings, an analyst must cover five or more qualified
stocks in the industry and at least two of them must be
among the 10 largest stocks. The WSJ requirements put
analysts at small BHs at a disadvantage, as small BHs typ-
ically focus on the coverage of small size stocks, which
are less likely to be included in the 10 largest stocks in
each specific industry. For example, in 2001, only 1,370
of over 4,000 analysts were eligible for the WSJ rankings;
the similar proportions are shown in other years.
TRANSACTION COSTS
Keim and Madhavan (1998) categorize transaction costs
into explicit costs (e.g., brokerage commissions and taxes)
and implicit costs (e.g., bid-ask spread and market impact
of trading). According to Hudson, Dempsey, and
Keasey (1996), the total round-trip transaction costs in
the UK stock market for the most favoured of investors is
upward of 1.0%, including government stamp duty of
0.5%, negotiated brokerage commission of 0.1% (soft com-
missions could be zero if alternative services are offered
in lieu of cash), and bid-ask spread of 0.5%. Based on a
relatively cautious estimate of the average round-trip
transaction costs in the UK for purchasing stocks at 1.5%
and for short selling stocks at 3.0%,18 we measure trans-
action costs multiplied by the corresponding average
daily portfolio turnover.
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Specifically, the daily turnover for the portfolio on the
trading date t is defined as the percentage of stocks in the
portfolio as of the close of trading on date t − 1 that has
changed by the close of trading on date t. That is, like
Barber et al. (2001), we measure the daily turnover as the
percentage of the portfolio that has been moved into
some other set of stocks on date t. For each stock i in
portfolio p as of the close of trading on date t − 1, we cal-
culate its fraction of the portfolio, Gi,t, at the end of trad-
ing on date t without accounting for portfolio
rebalancing:
Gi,t =ωi,t−1 × 1+Ri,tð Þ=
Xnp,t−1
i=1
ωi,t−1 × 1+Ri,tð Þ: ðA1Þ
Then, Gi,t is compared to the actual fraction Fi,t that
stock i makes up of portfolio p as of the close of trading
on date t, after accounting for any portfolio rebalancing.
Finally, the change in the percentage holding of each
stock on date t − 1 is summed, generating the portfolio
turnover on date t:
TURNOVERp,t =
Xnp,t
i=1
Gi,t−Fi,tj j: ðA2Þ
We calculate the net abnormal return as the gross
return less the estimated transaction costs multiplied by
the corresponding daily portfolio turnover.
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